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 I. SENSIBILITY AS PROPERTY: THE DESIGNS OF THE
 NEW VIRTUOUSNESS
 It may seem a little otiose to raise in these pages the notion of the
 sovereignty of learning at a time when a decade of Conservative
 government in Britain has secured decisive measures to bring the
 conduct of schooling into conformity with its own championship of a
 market economy approach to social policy. The scope and the effects
 of this new ascendancy in Britain have been explored in a number of
 recent articles in this journal (Quicke, 1988; Turner, 1989; Jonathan,
 1990). Educational reforms inspired by a similar kind of thinking,
 however, have been widely implemented in the United States during
 the decade of the 1980s. Some key features of the market approach
 have also infused educational discourse in other countries, notably
 Australia and Ireland.
 It is precisely the international character of the new ascendancy of
 market thinking in education which gives fresh urgency to the all but
 eclipsed claims of the sovereignty of learning. Of particular significance
 in these international developments have been the following features:
 (a) the dramatic recasting of education itself as a product, or
 quantifiable commodity, rather than as an attempted encounter with
 one or other cultural tradition or discipline of learning; (b) the
 associated rise of a commercial vocabulary in educational discourse,
 for instance the characterisation of students and their parents as
 'consumers' and of teachers as 'personnel' for the 'delivery' of the
 curriculum; and (c) the advocacy of vigorous competitiveness as the
 major instrument of educational advance, and the approbation of
 individual enterprise as one of its chief fruits. These three features
 mark a major mobilisation of moral energies on educational matters
 during the last decade, and constitute what may aptly be called a new
 educational virtuousness.
 The international parallels sketched here may suggest that where
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 ideals associated with the sovereignty of learning are concerned
 schooling has entered a new Dark Age. But before indulging any such
 suggestion, it may frankly be queried by the new virtuousness why
 learning as an enterprise should enjoy any sovereignty in the first
 place. Why should modern elected governments grant to publicly
 funded schooling powers and freedoms which the classical authors of
 Western civilization, such as Plato and Aristotle, were careful to
 reserve for the rulers of the state? The objection contained in the
 question gains further weight when we find hardly a handful of figures
 in the history of educational thought, including, this century, Karl
 Jaspers and Michael Oakeshott, who would uphold the autonomy, or
 sovereignty, of a human enterprise devoted to the pursuit of learning.
 Even Rousseau fails us in the final analysis in such a search, as does
 the anti-utilitarian champion of liberal learning, John Henry Newman.
 Recall, for instance, Rousseau's thoroughly conformist views on the
 education of girls (Sophie) and the remarkable extent of covert
 preparatory manipulation in his designs for the education of boys
 (Emile). Recall also Newman's acquiescence in Church authority
 over academic matters in the later Discourses of The Idea of a
 University. The history of educational institutions looks even bleaker
 than that of educational thought if we are seeking precedents for the
 sovereignty of learning. Could it be the case then that to grant the
 educational enterprise a dignified independence from current fashions
 and expedients in the world of getting and spending is a claim of
 dubious ancestry? Is this claim little more than a modern bid for
 power by an emergent liberal intelligentsia - a claim implicit in the
 writings of John Dewey, and imperfectly articulated thereafter by the
 pluralist educational philosophies of the 1960s and 70s? More
 specifically, is it an attempt by a growing establishment of professional
 educators to embrace a congenial but vaguely-defined tradition
 known as 'liberal education' - an establishment which hoped to
 dethrone older masters like church and state by capitalising on the
 rise of democratic sensibility in Western countries as the twentieth
 century advanced and grew more affluent?
 If the suggestions contained in these questions unveil the truth of
 the matter; if the answer to each of the questions is substantially 'yes',
 then the claim of sovereignty on behalf of learning can only be
 confirmed in its disarray. It is precisely this lingering disarray, this
 inadequacy of convincing philosophical articulation on the part of
 those professionally involved in the world of learning, which gives
 sustenance to a contrary claim from the new educational virtuousness.
 This contrary claim can be easily articulated, and in such a way that
 its own bid for democratic support is coherent and plausible. It is a
 135
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.163 on Tue, 08 Aug 2017 16:36:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEARNING
 claim which holds that educational thought and action must be
 regarded as essentially subservient to the political will of democratically
 elected governments; that the kinds of learning most valued by such
 governments must be promoted by schools, colleges and universities
 which enjoy receipts from the public purse; that educational practice
 must accordingly accept its standing as the handmaid of its resident
 upstairs masters, with no inherent entitlement to change how things
 are organised and conducted in its own downstairs chambers.
 Much of the plausibility and the democratic aura of this claim
 fades, however, when it is placed under scrutiny; in particular, when
 we realise that it is a claim which harbours proprietorial designs on
 the sensibilities of pupils and presumes accordingly upon the
 commitments of teachers. For if the conduct of education is to be
 regarded as essentially subservient to the preferences and expedients
 of the current party in power, then such preferences and expedients
 can, without scruple, impose themselves on the commitments of
 teachers and on the daily efforts of pupils. It may be replied of course
 that a government's fears of being unseated in the next election should
 guarantee against any serious misuse of influence during its term of
 office. In the first place this reply ignores the possibility that a future
 alternative government may find it difficult to undo the more
 questionable work of its predecessor. Secondly, it assumes that the
 conduct of education can be validly compared to that of politics,
 where commitments are generally as strong as the currently stronger
 party. Thirdly, associated with this last assumption, it fails to
 acknowledge that there are enduring commitments which are binding
 on teaching as an occupation, just as there are on occupations like
 legal practice, nursing and medical practice, or religious ministry,
 commitments which may not be negotiable in the court of
 politics.
 Without the provision of a coherent and robust account of such
 commitments, the new educational virtuousness may happily preside
 in the arena of learning much like a conquering prince in a
 vanquished province. Such provision is of course among the first tasks
 of the philosophy of education. But the philosophy of education
 cannot properly fulfil this task if, as in its dominant form of recent
 decades, it understands that it must (after Wittgenstein) 'leave
 everything as it is' and limit its legitimate scope to a 'second order'
 activity; or, more precisely, to a 'logical analysis of educational
 concepts' (see Peters & Hirst, 1970). Notwithstanding the merits of
 strict logical analysis in deliberations on educational matters, the
 philosophy of education cannot be either fully coherent in itself, or
 robust in the face of political attacks on schooling, if it fails to
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 acknowledge within its scope of enquiry the historical fortunes of
 educational concepts themselves. Concepts with dramatic, or some-
 times vexed, careers in the history of schooling include those like
 discipline, authority, freedom, responsibility, obedience, punishment,
 accomplishment, dissent, indoctrination, compulsion, equity, aptitude,
 ability, intelligence, assessment, interests, discrimination, tradition,
 to mention but a selection from a much longer list. The historical
 fortunes of educational concepts, it must be pointed out, show them to
 be quite different from purely logical concepts, such as those of
 mathematics. They thus call for a kind of investigation which
 recognises their shifting emphases and nuances in the course of the
 history of education. These differing emphases and nuances have
 furthermore influenced the outlooks and the institutions which are
 inherited and modified by the educational discourse and practice of
 each historical present. It thus becomes clear that a claim to
 sovereignty by an enterprise with an enduring commitment to
 learning greatly weakens its own case if it entrusts the safeguarding of
 this case to a logical philosophy short of historical perspective. Such a
 claim is deeply imperilled, moreover, if its shortcomings in giving a
 coherent and convincing account of itself leave it an easy victim amid
 the well-lobbied counter claims which abound in the cursory arena of
 modern democratic politics.
 The outcome seems inescapable, then, that if sovereignty of any
 significant kind is to be successfully sought for the claims of learning,
 a philosophical account of their entitlement to dignified treatment
 remains inadequate unless it includes a pertinent historical perspective
 on the ancestry and fortunes of such claims. From observations made
 a little earlier, it might be concluded that the history of educational
 thought, and that of educational institutions, may not prove too
 hospitable to such a project. This conclusion would indeed be true if
 the sovereignty being claimed for learning was absolute, or uncondi-
 tional in character. The project might prove much more fruitful,
 however, if the sovereignty claimed for learning is to be understood in
 a conditional rather than an absolute sense; understood, that is, not as
 a separatist province of schooling, but rather as the sovereignty of an
 enterprise accountable to the public for the freedom accorded to it in
 its exercise of a distinct and difficult office. We should become clearer
 about the precise nature and scope of this office, together with the
 discretionary freedoms it may fairly expect, as the project itself
 unfolds in the following sections.
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 2. THREE AGES OF LEARNING: ANTIQUITY, CHRISTENDOM
 AND MODERNITY
 In one form or another, the notion of piety has from antiquity until the
 rise of pluralism in the modern period been a central one in the history
 of Western learning. Although piety is now often taken to be another
 name for puritanism, or moral oppressiveness, the classical origins of
 the concept associate it closely with an inner emancipation, a cultured
 reverence for ideals regarded as edifying and morally binding.
 Socrates, who left us no written testament of his own, but whom we
 know was convicted on a charge of impiety, was one of the best
 exemplars of what the most generous sense of this ancient virtue
 means. Not only is this clear from the everyday evidence of his life-
 long commitment to learning to live worthily, but also from the
 dramatic events of the final days of his imprisonment. For instance,
 when provided with the chance of escape while awaiting his
 execution, his reverence for the sacredness of the Laws of Athens
 commanded him to decline the opportunity offered, and to explain his
 reasons patiently to his disappointed friends. Remaining with the
 classical period, the seminal writings of Plato and Aristotle on
 education, for all their notable differences, share an avowal of piety as
 a crucial characteristic: a devout concern for the good of the
 community, the Polis. In fact, if we fail to appreciate the authority and
 the subtlety of the concept of the Polis in Plato and in Aristotle, we risk
 caricaturing their arguments from the start, or understanding them in
 a naively superficial manner. The same is true of the writings of the
 two authors Cicero and Quintillian, which constitute the core of the
 Roman contribution to the educational traditions of the West. We
 might venture to translate Polis as 'the body politic', but this misses
 the point that what made the Polis a community was: (a) a shared
 understanding of being governed by some publicly recognised virtues
 (e.g. courage, truthfulness, pride); (b) a shared sense of disdain for
 some publicly recognised vices (e.g. cowardice, underhandedness,
 humility); (c) a shared avowal of the forceful, but ambivalent hand of
 the divinities in human affairs; and not least (d) the rather intimate
 scale of the Polis as a city state.
 With the spread of Christianity, the notion of piety received a new
 emphasis and application. The coronation of Charlemagne as Holy
 Roman Emperor around 800 AD marked the institutional beginnings
 of a new cultural pattern which, despite recurring setbacks and even
 decisive rifts, was to remain the prevailing one in Western history for
 a thousand years. This cultural pattern, universally known as
 Christendom, had the most far reaching consequences for how the
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 enterprise of education came to be understood and how its conduct
 came to be controlled. As William Boyd (1961) points out in his book,
 The History of Western Education, the pursuit of learning now came to be
 publicly viewed within boundaries fixed by the Church's interests and
 doctrines. This consecration of learning also meant that what the
 classical authors had viewed as the public community could no longer
 be seriously envisaged as a Polis, but rather as the universal kingdom
 of God-fearing Christians in obedience to their spiritual and temporal
 rulers.
 In this brief outline we can see that the classical notion of piety, as
 an educational quality, became embraced and redefined by the notion
 of Christian virtuousness. But we also see that this event was
 accompanied by the consolidation of the power of the church in
 political and institutional forms. Thus the authority of a Christian
 metaphysics eventually became the universal rule for learning in
 Christendom. The tensions and ambiguities present in classical
 conceptions of piety accordingly gave way to the more exact precepts
 of Church teaching. The schisms which occurred during the history of
 the Church, including the Reformation and its extended aftermath,
 served to make such teaching even more exact, and often more
 exacting. In short, with the denominalization of Christendom, the
 importance of Church authority and tradition increased rather than
 diminished. The consequences for the pursuit of learning and the
 control of schooling were both decisive and divisive in subsequent
 centuries.
 The efforts of the Renaissance humanist Erasmus to shake the hold
 of medieval metaphysics on learning and to advance the study of the
 pagan classics as well as Christian literature are worthy of particular
 attention in any consideration of the education legacy of Christendom.
 It is important to note that the piety of learning was assumed, not
 abandoned, by Erasmus. The piety he embraced, however, also
 nurtured a penetrating critique of many of the institutionalised
 practices of Christendom itself, including schooling. It embodied,
 moreover, a liberating self-critical discipline which was quite foreign
 to the established routines of study and scholarship of his era. The
 liberties adroitly claimed and exercised by Erasmus in his writings are
 thus of seminal import for any case being made for the sovereignty of
 learning. His ideas found little immediate application, due to the
 sectarian religious turmoil which had already won the day in his later
 years, but they provided a powerful imaginative stimulus to the cause
 of learning. In fact, Erasmus' belief that learning is essentially an
 adventure rather than an ordeal, an enrichment rather than a
 conquest of sensibility, and that its benefits should be made available
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 to all, not just the well-off, betoken commitments and aspirations
 which, had he stated them overtly, would have denied many of the
 underlying assumptions of educational practice in Christendom itself.
 To put it explicitly now, the practical thrust of Erasmus' humanism
 rests on the presupposition that, amid the continual struggle and
 tumble of enthroned and aspirant interests, there are enduring
 interests associated with learning which merit a civilised tolerance or
 sufferance from the authorities of church and realm; interests which
 are inherently educational in character, which are educational before
 they are ecclesiastical, or political, or commercial, or whatever. The
 point will be taken up a little later when considering the influence of
 the new educational virtuousness.
 The long ascendancy of Christendom, and of ecclesiastically
 sanctioned virtues in education, was not effectively contested until the
 later eighteenth century by what is generally called the Enlightenment
 or the Age of Reason. The Enlightenment is identified as the age of
 challenge to the rule of established authority and tradition. It paved
 the way for revolutionary movements of many kinds and it gave birth
 to the critical spirit in ethics and politics known as the spirit of
 modernity (see MacIntyre, 1985; Gadamer, 1975). So, in summary,
 we can broadly identify three Ages which mark decisive shifts in how
 the purposes of the educational enterprise came to be envisaged. The
 first two of these, the Classical Age and the Age of Christendom,
 identified learning with successive versions - Pagan and Christian - of
 the virtue of piety. This long association was to be weakened
 progressively by the endemic turbulence of the Age of Modernity.
 3. THE MANY FACES OF MODERNITY: FROM RADICAL PLURALISM
 TO COMPETITIVE INDIVIDUALISM
 To grasp the moral import of modernity it is necessary to emphasise
 the distinction between virtues and values. The word 'values' enjoys
 widespread currency nowadays. The word 'virtues' by contrast has
 connotations of the past and even a quaintly nostalgic ring. The
 distinction underlies the difference between sacred and secular
 conceptions of learning which occasioned intense acrimony in the
 wake of the Enlightenment. The Napoleonic sequel to the French
 Revolution for instance represented a decisive blow to the authority of
 religiously sanctioned virtues. The new system of state schools
 and universities signalled that the Bonapartist state had its own
 strategic interests in the arena of education and that these had little to
 do with the virtue of piety but rather with the training of loyal citizens
 and good soldiers, and the advancement of technical expertise.
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 Where schooling was concerned, these interests now took precedence
 over any interests of the Church (Thompson, 1966, pp. 58-59). Not
 only in France, but throughout Europe, the nineteenth century
 increasingly became an era of rival conceptions of social and political
 order in which the rule of established authority and tradition,
 particularly that of royalty and the churches, was repeatedly
 subjected to attack. A proliferation of emergent ideologies, including
 industrialism, utilitarianism, nationalism, democracy, secularism,
 and communism, sought the allegiance of an increasingly urbanised
 and growing diverse public.
 The critical spirit of modernity was embodied in different degrees in
 these various movements. Even so, contestability and disparateness
 were already taking root as definitive rather than occurrent character-
 istics of the moral and political climate of nations and societies.
 Associated with this was a new political conception of education as
 an instrument to be fought for, controlled and pressed into service in
 advancing the sphere of influence of aspirant ideologies.
 We can see in these developments the origins of what we now call
 pluralism, that is, the co-existence in one society of groups and
 individuals whose basic outlooks are different in essential rather than
 in minor respects. The rise of Liberalism in politics was clearly linked
 to these developments. John Henry Newman's distaste for Liberalism
 in Britain, for instance, arose from his perception of its bland
 tolerance of different religious traditions, without accepting the
 binding authority of any of them. This example serves to highlight the
 difference between virtues and values. What virtues represented for
 upholders of a religious tradition, values came to represent for the
 critical spirit of modernity, particularly that spirit which disavows
 allegiance to a religious tradition. Strictly speaking, then, values are
 what the person who wishes to exercise a critical moral autonomy
 views herself or himself as freely choosing in any situation, without
 necessary avowal of religious authority or moral tradition. A
 commitment to virtues, by contrast, invariably involves a degree of
 deference to a tradition of belief and conduct, even if this deference is
 tacit, or unconscious, or qualified (e.g. religious traditions, patriotic
 traditions, trade union traditions, democratic traditions, hierarchic
 cultural traditions and so on).
 It is widely held that the spirit of modernity, and its respect for
 freely chosen values, has finally come of age in those Western societies
 where a libertarian and secularist outlook has become the predominant
 one in the regulation of human affairs, including the arrangements for
 formal education. Such societies are regarded as having finally shaken
 off the burden of an oppressive metaphysics, as having appropriated
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 technology to the efficient organisation of public affairs and as
 allowing their citizens freedom to pursue their individual interests,
 subject only to the constraints of civil law. Yet this modern triumph
 for individual liberties, notwithstanding its distinct advancement of
 human entitlements, has in itself much of a disquieting metaphysical
 character. That is to say, in its rationalist form of secular individualism,
 it harbours assumptions about the significance of being human and
 about the conduct of human affairs which may be as doctrinal and
 doctrinaire as any metaphysics furnished by classical, medieval or
 modern philosophy. Such doctrinal and doctrinaire features have
 been increasingly apparent during the last decade, most notably in
 the dramatic prominence of competitive individualism and 'market
 forces' in the social policies of many Western governments. These
 features are evident in a particular way in what was described at the
 outset as the new educational virtuousness. It is now necessary to
 examine the ancestry of this virtuousness at closer range.
 4. THE MORAL ANCESTRY OF THE NEW VIRTUOUSNESS
 The central virtue of the new educational virtuousness is not in itself a
 new virtue. It can neither be classed as one of the values of modernity,
 nor even as being educational in character. It is rather a virtue
 founded on the doctrine of classical economics that every member of
 society, by seeking his or her own material advantage, contributes
 best to the balanced functioning of society as a whole. Adam Smith
 laced this doctrine with theological flavour when he advocated it in
 The Wealth of Nations in 1776. Smith believed, in accordance with the
 teachings of his major philosophical work, The Theory of Moral
 Sentiments, that man's earthly self-interest would be tempered by
 God's providential benevolence, or more precisely by what he saw as
 the conscientious 'viceregents' of the Divine in each individual, and
 would thereby in the main be an enlightened self-interest. Thus
 Smith's doctrine, proclaimed in The Wealth of Nations, of the 'invisible
 hand' (of the Deity) averred that any hardships or indignities
 occasioned by the specialisation of labour would be compensated for
 by greater wealth for all, including labour. Notwithstanding Smith's
 detailed qualifications, unscrupulous readings of his theory soon gave
 an unprecedented respectability to economic greed which was rapidly
 embraced by landowners and industrialists who artfully overlooked
 any necessity to keep an ear tuned to the promptings of the
 'viceregents' of Divine Providence. In short, doctrinaire self-interest
 soon became a respectable and powerful moral-political tradition in
 itself.
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 What distinguished self-interest from straightforward greed in
 Smith's theory was the balance provided by the virtue of benevolence.
 Without this virtue, which for Smith was underwritten by his own
 belief in the indirect workings of Divine Providence, his theory could
 not count as a theory of the public good. Rather, it would now count
 only as a theory of wealth accumulation. As a discerning moral
 philosopher, Smith himself was scarcely unaware of this. His
 references to God as the 'Author of nature' and the 'Conductor of the
 universe' reveal, however, the curious innocence of his faith in
 Providence, and in what he called 'the natural progress of opulence'.
 We are now so well acquainted with systematic exploitation of the
 vulnerable, with recurrences of genocide and with warfare on a global
 scale that the strategic role attributed to Providence by Smith can no
 longer be sustained in any convincing moral or political philosophy.
 Not so familiar, however, are two related conclusions which follow
 from this. Firstly, any respectability which acquisitiveness might
 nowadays seek to attribute to itself by locating its moral roots in
 Adam Smith's philosophy can be seen to be a spurious respectability.
 Secondly, the theory of 'public good through enlightened self-
 interest', disrobed of its flawed religious underpinnings in Smith's
 arguments, can no longer plausibly count as a theory of the common
 good. Yet the recent renaissance of earthly individualism in many
 Western countries has been possible mainly because the governments
 in these countries have vigorously proclaimed as newly worthy virtues
 those springing from economic self-interest, or, in the new vocabulary,
 the virtues of 'privatization' in any field where a commitment to
 public funding has been traditionally involved.
 Where the new virtuousness can legitimately claim some ancestry
 from Smith, however, is in its attitude to schooling as an instrument
 for the production of 'human capital'; in other words, the cultivation
 of learning with a view to harnessing its benefits to wealth creating
 'employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill' (The
 Wealth of Nations). Another feature of the new virtuousness which has
 clear origins in Smith's thinking is the currently controversial concept
 of 'merit pay' for teachers. Smith's advocacy in his Wealth of Nations of
 a forceful version of this concept argued that 'Publick services are
 never better performed than when their reward comes only in
 consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the
 diligence employed in performing them'. Smith seemed to regard
 teaching as an essentially laborious duty - an occupation with little
 promise of inherent reward for a freely given professional commitment.
 This rather parsimonious view is betrayed in his noted argument
 against standard salaries for teachers:
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 It is in the interest of every man to live at much at his ease as he
 can; and if his emoluments are to be precisely the same, whether he
 does or does not perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly in
 his interest, at least as interest is vulgarly understood, either to
 neglect it altogether, or, if he is subject to some authority which will
 not suffer him to do this, to perform it in as careless and slovenly a
 manner as that authority will permit (The Wealth of Nations, Book V,
 ch 5).
 The recasting of education as a sub-species of political economy, the
 portrayal of teaching as a necessary toilsome labour rather than as an
 occupational commitment to the advancement of learning, and the
 reluctance to acknowledge inherent dignity in learning itself are, then,
 the ancestral features of the new educational virtuousness. They mark
 a brusque disavowal of the more noteworthy traditions of learning
 which distinguished the classical and Christian periods of Western
 civilization. They also mark a decisive stage in the march of utilitarian
 ideas - from the incipient utilitarianism of Locke, through Smith's
 contributions, to the fully fledged utilitarianism of Bentham's
 Chrestomathia. Thus were nurtured the seeds of an industrious and
 commonsense oblivion, of a curt incomprehension towards any claim
 to sovereignty voiced by places of learning on behalf of pietas or
 humanitas.
 5. THE NEW VIRTUOUSNESS AND THE INTERESTS OF EDUCATION
 The rehabilitation of cupidity endorsed by the secularisation of
 classical economics proceeded in a new key during the 1980s. The
 remarkable renaissance of this economics became a major force not
 merely as a neo-classical fashion in political economy, but as an
 internationally emergent moral and political tradition. The educa-
 tional virtuousness described in this essay as 'new' is so because it
 describes an unprecedented attempt by this emergent tradition to
 subject the conduct of learning to its own control. We need to make
 more explicit, then, the nature and scope of the claim which this
 virtuousness assumes over the interests of education. The first thing
 which must be pointed out in this connection is that the phrase 'the
 interests of education' is itself a likely candidate for the curt
 incomprehension mentioned just a moment ago. Clearly, the new
 virtuousness recognises key interests associated with schooling, but its
 first concern is to redefine these in terms of its own orthodoxies and to
 tailor them to the current priorities of government. In a speciously
 democratic way, the denial of sovereignty to the claims of learning is
 144
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.163 on Tue, 08 Aug 2017 16:36:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEARNING
 here as complete as anything decreed by the metaphysics of
 Christendom. Where the traditional concept of piety offered a subtle
 and inviting promise for advancing the claims and the culture of
 learning - a promise richly realised for instance by Erasmus - the
 brusqueness which attends the utilitarianism of the new virtuousness
 offers little such promise. Its awareness of the dignity of learning is
 obscured from the start by its doctrinaire preoccupation with the cost
 of learning and by the necessity to prepare human capital in the most
 useful and cost-effective way.
 To speak of the interests of education, therefore, as a class of human
 interests entitled to civic dignity and protection is to call attention
 precisely to that which the new educational virtuousness has
 obscured. It is, firstly, to describe a culture of schooling which
 acknowledges its own indebtedness in a generous, yet critical way, to
 the richness which speaks in many voices from the achievements of
 earlier generations of learning which seek their continuation and
 enlargement in the earnest efforts of the present. It is to describe,
 moreover, the kind of teaching and learning which seeks always to be
 universally defensible, as distinct from sectional or partisan in its
 conduct; which engages both intellect and sensibility, but which
 entertains proprietorial designs on neither; which is assiduous in its
 efforts to unearth and to bring to fluency such abilities as are native to
 each pupil and are worthy of disciplined nurturing. In a word, the
 interests of education are more properly concerned with enablement
 than with inculcation, but not with just any kind of enablement. None
 of this is to suggest that technological studies or vocational training
 should be relegated in favour of the arts and pure sciences. Rather, it
 is to say that the elicitation and promotion of each pupil's ownmost
 promise where learning is concerned - whether that may ultimately
 lead the pupil towards an occupation as a poet or programmer, priest
 or politician - expresses the prior commitment of the interests of
 education.
 The interests of education are properly pursued as a public concern
 through the conduct of formal schooling. Now this engagement is
 widely taken to be one of the major means for the cultivation and
 exercise of rationality by any society which avows a commitment to
 reason in the regulation of its public affairs. In this sense, the spirit of
 modernity itself, which subscribes in a particular way to the authority
 of reason, might provide an appropriate clue for understanding the
 scope and play of rationality in the interests of education and in the
 new educational virtuousness.
 At once we encounter a possible pitfall. The everyday use of the
 words 'reason', 'rational', and 'rationality' to describe a central
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 attribute of the form of practical life championed by modernity often
 obscures the fact that there is more than one rationality. This
 common oversight misses the point that rationality itself is always a
 characteristic of one or other culture, or way of life; that our
 conceptions of reason are invariably laden with a significant cultural
 past. There are, therefore, different rationalities, just as there are
 different cultures. Even within a single country the existence of
 different cultures and traditions signals the presence of different
 rationalities, sometimes conflicting rationalities. For example, ration-
 ality and practical reasoning will be envisaged very differently by the
 two following groups:
 (a) those who understand social life primarily as an arena in which
 each individual or each group of individuals rightly seeks to
 maximise the satisfaction of his or her own wants and needs;
 (b) those who understand social life primarily as an arena where
 the good of each individual is envisaged primarily as the
 counterpart of the promotion of the individual excellences of each
 and all.
 From what has been argued so far it should be clear that the interests
 of education, or the claims of learning to enjoy some sovereignty,
 properly belong in the second group. Yet the new educational
 virtuousness seeks to place education in the first and to press the
 enterprise of learning itself into service in advancing the influence of
 an individualist culture. A moment's reflection is enough to alert us
 that enablement means quite different things in each context. One of
 the main consequences of the orthodox shift of educational endeavour
 to the individualist context in recent years is that schooling can thus
 concentrate on catering to those who are already seen to be agreeably
 industrious or compliant, and are thus judged to be on the road to
 reward and success by the rationality of the individualist culture. The
 corollary of this is that practical reasoning in such a culture can
 plausibly disclaim any but a minimal responsibility for those who fail
 to demonstrate the qualities of initiative in their studies; for those
 whose performance on so-called 'standard attainment' tests are an
 embarrassment to themselves; for those whose parents fail to show
 connoisseurship in their choice of school; in short, for those whom the
 new virtuousness more frankly regards as losers.
 To return to the point mentioned in the opening sentence of this
 paper, where the new educational virtuousness has shown itself to be
 so successful in imposing its writ, it may seem foolhardy to argue any
 case for the sovereignty of learning. Such a doleful conclusion,
 however, betrays both the mentality of the vanquished and an
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 ignorance of history. More specifically, it overlooks two crucial points.
 Firstly, had the conduct of learning, from the infant school to the
 university, been circumspect in its own pursuit of the interests of
 education during the expansionary decades of the 1960s and 1970s;
 had the fashions which then became prominent in the social sciences
 and educational studies nurtured the discipline of self-criticism as
 much as they nurtured that of critique; the case of learning would
 have been much more ably served and the new educational
 virtuousness would have had much more difficult pickings. The
 benefits of hindsight have a salutary lesson to teach here. Secondly,
 the most inhospitable of circumstances for the interests of education
 can force a new concentration of minds on essentials in the conduct of
 teaching and learning, and thus gradually give energy and
 momentum to a quality of educational leadership previously absent
 among teachers, school principals, academics and educational
 managements. Such circumstances can provoke the emergence of a
 new and circumspect tradition of educational leadership. An
 emergent tradition of this kind, where it is newly aware of the
 defensibility and the vulnerability of the interests of education, is also
 conscious of the necessity not to court the favour of politicians, but to
 earn the enduring respect of pupils and of parents for the achieve-
 ments of schools and colleges. By acknowledging in a radically new
 way that teachers, pupils and parents share a common purpose, local
 school managements can pursue new opportunities to support and
 defend the earnest efforts of schools and colleges, and to uphold their
 achievements before the public. By such honest means, rather than by
 the devices of propaganda, are the interests of education served in a
 democracy. By such means also are the public's elected representatives
 properly apprised of the dignity and the merited sovereignty of
 learning.
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